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Abstract Social sciences are experiencing an anticipatory
turn. A core issue of this turn are the so-called ‘weak signals’.
In order to speak of this type of signals, we must use the
distinction between weak and strong. The question may be
raised, who handles this distinction? That is, who is the ob-
server? It seems that only two answers are possible: the ob-
server is either outside or inside, i.e., either he is a world-
observer, or he is a extra-world-observer. In the latter case,
the problem of weak signals disappears; after the fact, every-
body is able to say BI told you!^. In the former case, the
system has to face the dilemma of warning signals. As social
systems cannot observe themselves from the outside, the issue
of weak signals should be explained as the outcome of a self-
referential dynamics that finally leads to the paradox of know-
ing the unknown. In fact, the difference between weak and
strong refers not to the future as such (to what is signalized),
but to the observing system itself. The main hypothesis of this
contribution is that a signal is weak for a lack of redundancy
that hinders the system to combine a reference to an environ-
mental event with a concomitant reference to a systemic cog-
nitive map. By means of a system theory of sign, it should be
possible to see the difference between weak and strong as an
unfolding device for temporal paradoxes arising in social sys-
tems, and to support the hypothesis that, since in social sys-
tems cognitive maps are contingent on time, signals can be
only weak, never strong.
Keywords Anticipation .Weak signals . Paradox . System
theory . Superignorance .Warning signals
Anticipatory systems in modern society
Social sciences are experiencing an anticipatory turn. The rel-
evance of this topic is indisputable, so it is to be hoped that
research may further be developed and intensified. However,
it is hard to say whether this turn implies a real change of
paradigm. The same attitude toward the idea of anticipation
is somehow ambivalent. On the one hand, scholars agree that
Banticipations are ubiquitous^ both in natural and social sys-
tems; consequently, every scientific discipline is dealing with
it [1]. On the other hand, scholars complain about the fact that
anticipation is a neglected concept, which deserves more at-
tention.1 However, the anticipatory turn in social sciences can
be observed also from the sociology of knowledge standpoint.
The sociological concern with the topic ‘anticipation’ could be
grasped as the outcome of fundamental structural changes
which gave birth to modern society. I would like to outline
only some of the most relevant hallmarks of this change. This
short introduction will be used as a socio-theoretical back-
ground for further arguments in this article.
As well known, modern society is characterized by a rever-
sal of temporal attitudes. During the transitional period be-
tween the 14th and 17th centuries, past gave up its primacy
to future. Consequently, future became the principal irritating
source for present.2 In the mid-1970s, Niklas Luhmann [7]
already noted that the arising debate on Bmore anticipatory
1 Cf. Glasersfeld’s synopsis [2]. Glasersfeld is one of the few scholars
who reminded that Hume’s theory of causal inference was one of the first
modern thematizations of anticipation. The reference work for the revival
of this topic is Rosen [3]. See also Poli [4, 5], with large literature.
2 Cf. Koselleck [6], who refers to life insurance in the 18th century.
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behaviour^, on Bmore future-oriented planning^ in decision-
making processes (especially in formal organizations) could
be regarded as a consequence of the social transition from a
closed future to an open future. This temporal change implies
the relinquishment of an ontological representation of time. In
Stoicism, what-will-be is already what-it-is, although men can
neither foresee nor predict the future. Since future cannot be
foreseen, it is meaningless to anticipatorily worry about what
could be and could be not. Thus, true certainty is the absence
of cares (sine cura, that is, without concern [about the future]),
and only men who are not in need of future and do not reckon
their time-to-come are truly virtuous.3
In the mid-17th century, time-consciousness is radically
different. Future does not exist because it has no being at all.
Future is simply a Bfiction in the mind^ ([8] p. 10): the ob-
serving system can construct such a fiction all over again
because time-to-come never becomes present. ‘Open’ future
means that observers can figure out a set of rival hypotheses,
which has space for residual hypotheses [9]. The function of
such residual hypotheses is to mark the unpredictability of
future events which observers attempt to control through
decisions.
One of the main results of this temporal habit is that mod-
ern society has an only seemingly contradictory relationship
with uncertainty. On the one hand, it regards uncertainty as a
fundamental resource for decision-making. On the other hand
(and in sight of decisions to be taken), it regards uncertainty as
a problem to be solved. However, the awareness lies in the
background that without uncertainty it would be impossible to
take a decision.
Indeed, in the Middle Ages uncertainty had already been
regarded as a resource that could offer some advantages. The
main argument was produced by theology, and dealt with the
difference between time and eternity. Because of certainty
(securitas), men are lazy and prove ungrateful to the Lord.
By contrast, uncertainty (sollicitudo) reminds men that the
true peace is in afterlife and that it shall be gained through
actions.4
In modern society, the concern with uncertainty is mostly
secularized. Uncertainty in human life looses its religious con-
notations, whereas in turn religion is no longer regarded as a
serious (and efficient) remedy to addressing the uncertainties
of everyday life. For instance, life insurance is a substantially
more efficient device; consequently, the family man who
places his trust in Providence is irresponsible. In addition,
uncertainty becomes a generalized trouble of any social sys-
tem. Consequently, while it deals with Bextrem verunsicherten
Zukunftsperspektiven^ (extremely uncertain future-perspec-
tives), society is based on an institutionalized culture of
providence, and regards itself as a BVersicherungs-
Gesellschaft^ (insurance-society).5
This reappraisal of uncertainty is followed by a reversal of
attributions. The primacy of external attribution is replaced
with the primacy of internal attribution of events. The final
result is what contemporary society calls ‘risk society’. This
transformation cannot be overestimated because it permeates
all social structures, and even concerns the attribution of nat-
ural events [12–15]. Obviously, causality is not suspended,
nor it is replaced with imputation. As previously, virus causes
flu; flood is caused by water. However, the availability of a
vaccine changes the danger of falling ill into the decisional
risk BShould I vaccinate or not?^. In turn, the responsibility
for disasters produced by flood can be imputed to the bad
maintenance and surveillance of riverbanks. In this very sense,
risk is a social construction.
Against the background of these preliminary assumptions,
I will try to explain that the topic of ‘weak signals’ is a con-
sequence of structural changes in modern society, and that
these changes have drawn our attention on complex cognitive
systems as a type of anticipatory systems. In § 2, I introduce
the hypothesis that we still lack a consistent theory of weak
signals because, instead of wondering how it is possible that
an environmental event can perform a signalling function,
social sciences usually deal with signals as if they were things.
I feel that the difficulties of semiotics could be overcome by a
system theory of signals. To develop such a theory, a method-
ological rule should be followed: the observing system is
somehow part of its own observations. That is, the moving
question should be BHow do I observe?^, rather than simply
BWhat do I observe?^. Moreover, we shall move from the
assumption that time can never be observed out of time.
In addition, in § 3, I will try to show that a contradiction
hides in the concept ‘weak signal’: the signal is relevant – that
is, strong – simply because the observer who is dealing with it
already knows how it came to an end. The question about the
information value of weak signals is somehow overlooked
because the signal is observed retrospectively. From this
standpoint, the distinction between weak and strong may be
regarded as an asymmetry that is used both to solve a tautol-
ogy and to unfold a paradox – the circularity of temporal
observations of time.
Subsequently, I study the signalling function from the
standpoint of self-referential systems theory. The principle of
operational closure and the concept of structural coupling of
system and environment support the hypothesis that cognitive
systems prompt themselves when they interact with their own
environment; in other words, ‘irritations’ are systemic inner
constructions. Consequently, systems cope with structural un-
certainties, which can be regarded as a type of ‘social
3 Seneca,Ep. ad Luc., 92, 25: BQuid est in virtute præcipuum? Futuro non
indigere nec dies suos computare^.
4 In this respect, the main source is Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XIX, 10.
5 According to the well-known definition given by Ewald [10]. See also
Luhmann ([11] p. 130).
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signalling system’. In § 4, I try to show that this signalling
system is more complicated than signals, which steer the sys-
temic coupling with natural environment because society be-
haves as a historical machine. Such behaviour implies that
both system and environment behave ‘anticipatorily’. Thus,
anticipation becomes reflexive and second-order anticipations
arise from this type of reflexivity. The main hypothesis of
mine is that environment is what is not anticipated when a
system tries to anticipate the environment. In other words,
systems behave in an anticipatory manner because the envi-
ronment cannot be anticipated. Being operatively closed, the
system reacts to its own anticipation of the future rather than to
the future as such.
On the basis of these rather abstract assumptions, in § 5, I
will return on the topic of weak signals moving from an em-
pirical case study: the signals of an economic upturn in Italy.
By means of this example, I introduce the idea that in modern
society one of the most successful anticipatory systems is
statistical probability. This calculus does problematize and
de-problematize the future; consequently, it offers a ‘substitute
for certainty’ that can be exploited in decision-making pro-
cesses. In § 6, finally, I deal with some recent developments
of the idea of weak signals in the sociology of organizations.
This discipline introduced successful concepts into the scien-
tific debate, for instance, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’. The
provisional result of these sociological surveys is that the true
problem actually is that the observer doesn’t know that he
doesn’t know. Social systems try to cope with this second-
order ignorance, or ‘super-ignorance’, when they address
weak signals. As a consequence, current society is living in
a condition of ‘chronic fear’. In fact, I feel that in society every
signal should be regarded as a weak signal; unfortunately, this
conclusion jeopardizes the usefulness of the distinction be-
tween weak and strong.
Toward a system theory of signals
A core issue of the anticipatory turn in social sciences are the
so-called ‘weak signals’. According to Roberto Poli ([16] p.
32), weak signals are Bles fondements de toute société^ (the
true foundation of the whole society). As well known, the idea
of weak signals arose in the mid-1970s in association with
other anticipatory ideas such as ‘strategic management’ or
‘strategic surprise’.6 At the time, the question was why no-
body had foreseen the oil crisis. Nowadays, the question is
more or less the same; however, oil crisis has been substituted
by financial crisis. Consequently, everybody is now looking
for (weak) signals of a (weak) upturn in the economy.
Moreover, in public opinion there is a surfeit of signals
referring to social changes. People feel that there is not a stable
reality that everybody can refer to, but only signals of a reality
that is everyday different and will never stabilize because in
the meanwhile signals are changing, or simply because people
will forget to verify if reality eventually became what signals
had once signalized.
The debate on weak signals developed during the 1980s.
However, only in the 1990s there was a true revival of this
topic. In the meantime, literature became very large, while
related concepts are still proliferating (sociologists speak of
‘wildcards’, ‘seeds of change’, ‘emerging issues’). As a con-
sequence, the definition of ‘weak signal’ is now substantially
more ambiguous and unclear than previously [19, 20]. I feel
that this ambiguity is the result of the incapability of social
sciences to explain what a ‘signal’ actually is. Therefore, my
purpose in this article is to attempt to give an explanation of
weak signals, and to clarify some core ideas of the theory of
anticipatory systems by means of the interdisciplinary ap-
proach of social systems theory.7
To speak of weak signals, one has to use the distinction
between weak and strong. The question may be raised BWho
handles this distinction?^. That is, BWho is the observer?^. It
seems that only two answers are possible: either the observer
belongs to the world that he is observing, or he is outside of
the world that is observed. Either he is a world-observer, or he
is a extra-world-observer. To aptly understand weak signals,
we must handle this distinction in a proper manner. In fact, the
distinction between inside and outside is more complicated
than it appears. According to a constructivist approach, an
outer observer cannot exist. If he could exist, he would be
nothing for the world because his observations were not vis-
ible to world-observers. Also a prophet shall communicate his
prophecy if he wants this prophecy to be known. However,
when it is communicated, prophecy becomes a social event
among many others social events of the same kind. Prophecy
may be observed, interpreted, reported. In short, it is linked to
the recursive network of similar events reproduced by society.
Thus, observers are always inside, although they can observe
the world as if they were outside. The difference between
inner and outer observer is not a difference between two real
observers, it is a difference between two reflexive uses of the
distinction between inside and outside.
If the observer is outside of the observed world, time-
consciousness takes on the form of determinism. Past and
future are already present for those who observe the world
from the standpoint of eternity. In pre-modern societies, such
a performance is a quality of prophets and diviners. Thus, the
cockcrow is a signal that confirms a past prefiguration of the
future in the present. It has no information value, that it, it is
not surprising. By contrast, if the observer is inside the
6 The reference work is Ansoff [17]. For an updated discussion on early
and later specifications of this concept, see Holopainen, Toivonen [18].
7 In the present paper, social systems are communication systems.
Everything that is not communication lies in the environment.
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observed world, time-consciousness takes on the form of
decisionism. Past and future are simply constructions contin-
ually reproduced by an observer who is embedded in the cur-
rent present (in Shackle’s terms, in the ‘moment-in-being’)
and deals with provisional memories and expectations.
Under these circumstances, any decision depends on the fu-
ture that one would like to realize, whereas in turn future
(intentionally and not intentionally) depends on the taken de-
cision.8 The decision-maker is aware that it is not his attempt
to plan the future by means of rational foresights that changes
the circumstances; rather it is his attempt to realize the plan,
i.e., the taken action, that changes the circumstances under
which the (foreseen) future will realize. Consequently, the
situation is undecidable.9
These different temporal approaches affect the type of ori-
entation one is searching for when he is dealing with an un-
known future. In this respect, divination had developed very
clever techniques to producing information. The basic as-
sumption was that, whereas gods have certain knowledge of
visible and invisible events, men have to search for clues and
conjectures. These clues (in modern terms, these weak sig-
nals) could be found in nature or intentionally produced by
men. In both cases, they required a special art of interpretation.
Information production could not be performed at will.
Artificial divination provided a Bprocédure expérimentale
méthodiquement organisée^. Obviously, the purpose of such
procedure was not to set observers’ minds at rest by means of
a certain knowledge of future. Artificial divination produced
sentences and conjectures that should be in turn interpreted.
Consequently, that opacity (that ‘weakness’) that divination
should in principle eliminate was introduced into the world
again even if with a different shape ([25] p. 36; [26] p. 23).
The advantage of this unusual procedure was that observers
had a relatively transparent technique for dealing with future
opacity.
If the observing system relinquishes an extra-world posi-
tion, it has to cope with temporal reflexivity. The distinction
between past and future re-enters into the time. The observer
can observe past and future as such. He can also observe past
presents and future presents, too. From the standpoint of these
temporal positions, the current situation looks like a past fu-
ture or future past. The outcome of this temporal reflexivity is
a huge increasing of complexity that the observer can employ
but must also tame in order to take a decision.10
Thematter is not simply that after the fact everybody is able
to say BI told you!^. Decision-makers can anticipate their post-
decisional regret, and they are well aware that also avoiding
decision-making has consequences which might be retro-
spectively attributed to a decision-maker. The latter should
assume responsibility for his decision not to decide. If it is
impossible not to decide, it is impossible to avoid decisional
risks, as well. The situation is therefore substantially more
complicated than it seems, and I feel that the possibility of
explaining the modern dilemma of warning signals depends
on the capability to clarify this complexity.
In my opinion, the main obstacle is a – so to speak – onto-
logical rather than phenomenological understanding of the
concept of signal. The question should be BHow is it possible
that in the inner-social environment an event signalize a future
change?^. This question is evaded because signals are man-
aged as if they were things, thus bracketing the observer. From
a constructivist standpoint, we should rather bracket the ob-
served reality and include the observer in what is observed. In
this way, we could avoid reifying the concept of signal. Social
research should explain how it is possible that something can
perform a signalling function. This approach could be the
starting point for a systemic (rather than simply semiotic) the-
ory of signals. In this respect, the main hypothesis could be
that a whatever reference to an environmental event (or state)
becomes a signal when it can affect the self-reference of an
observing system. By means of such a constraint, the observ-
ing system can selectively reproduce the operative unity of the
difference between recall and expectation. To construct such a
theory, we first need a theory of anticipation.
The strongness of weak signals
Notwithstanding the relevance of scientific research, I feel that
a contradiction hides behind the current debate on weak sig-
nals. To worry about weak signals is reasonable only if you
already know that they signalize strong changes – for instance,
a catastrophe or a disaster that you would rather avoid (if
possible). However, only the observer who already knows
how it came to an end can be aware of it. This is the reason
why the discussion onweak signals usually has a retrospective
structure.Why no one did perceive these signals?Why no one
held the signalized change for relevant? In short, why nobody
understood the strongness of weak signals?
This contradiction (the signal was weak, and yet it was
retrospectively strong too with respect to events) is based on
the fact that a future which does not exist is unknown. Before
starting an enterprise, everybody would like to know to which
signals he will have to pay attention in order to seize oppor-
tunities and not to run risks. Moreover, a strong signal of a
weak change, or a weak signal of a weak change were not a
problem for anyone. The difference between weak and strong
is used to symbolically bridge the temporal gap between sig-
nalized and signal. As a consequence, the problem of lacking
information is softened, if not neutralized.
8 Even in decisionism, future does not fully depend on the taken decision.
There might be other influences, too.
9 The distinction between determinism and decisionism is drawn from
Shackle [21, 22]. The transition from prophecy to rational forecasting has
been clearly explained, moving from Koselleck [6], by Esposito [23, 24].
10 On this temporal reflexivity, see Luhmann ([27] p. 129–130).
 4 Page 4 of 13 Eur J Futures Res  (2016) 4:4 
Inmodern society, which is obsessed by the need of dealing
with an open future, uncertainty is a resource but also a prob-
lem for every decision-making process. And every decision-
maker must address the circularity of temporal references that
turns any present into an undecidable situation. However, this
undecidability is the essential condition that makes a decision
possible [28]. In other words, if future could be decided, we
should simply wait that the decided future eventually occurs.
There would be no decision any more that could be taken.
Every type of action could no longer affect the future that
ineluctably unfolds itself. Social reality would turn into a de-
terministic machine. On the contrary, if future cannot be de-
cided we are able (and compelled too) to take decisions whose
outcome cannot be fully predicted. Every decision-maker is
therefore coping with an unpredictable future that depends on
predicting decisions. To start a decision-making process, the
circular relationship that links future and decisionmust be first
of all turned into some kind of viable circularity.
This transformation is possible if, for instance, an asym-
metric distinction is introduced. The latter does not remove the
self-referential circularity; it rather enables the observing sys-
tem to gain at least some information [29]. The distinction
between strong and weak is just an example of this type of
asymmetries. This distinction refers to the observer rather than
to the observed reality, and marks the ignorance which the
observer has to cope with when he tries to get some bearings
in the opacity of the time-to-come. In other terms, what is weak
is the attention paid to the signal rather than the change in the
situation that was signalized. As a consequence, the circular
self-referentiality of observation does not turn into a tautology.
In this respect, Ansoff himself had distinguished future
uncertainty into an uncertainty which preserves a certain con-
tinuity compared with the past and therefore enables observers
to estimate historical regularities, and an uncertainty which,
on the contrary, is characterized by discontinuities and can
become a threat or an opportunity. Ansoff’s firm belief was
that these discontinuities could be Banticipated by available
forecasting techniques^ ([17] p. 22) – which is to say, if the
firm were able to forecast temporal discontinuities between
past and future it would let itself not be surprised by such
discontinuities, whereas, indeed, the only thing that can be
foreseen is the continuity of discontinuities.
To understand how it is possible that an event may perform
a signalling function, one has first of all to take into consider-
ation the principle of operational closure. Communication sys-
tems have no operational contact with the external environ-
ment because they cannot link themselves with the outside
world by means of their own operations [30–32]. Society
can communicate on the environment but not with the envi-
ronment. From the standpoint of a system, the environment is
simply the filling of systemic external references, which are
continually combined with concomitant systemic self-refer-
ences. If the environment is conceived in temporal terms as
time-to-come, it is clear that nobody can hurry up into the
future to see what is going on and then come back to tell what
he found.
In turn, the environment cannot communicate with a sys-
tem. The former can behave either in a disruptive way (skiers
are swept away by an avalanche, nobody can communicate
anymore), or as irritation (a skier warns the other ones of the
avalanche danger). Consequently, a system that is irritated by
the environment changes its state, and yet every change of
state is a systemic operation. In fact, closure does not mean
closeness ([33] p. 147). A system does not exist without a
respective environment; in turn the environment does not exist
without a reference to a respective system. However, only
systems can recursively reproduce their own operations by
means of the outcome of previous operations. In turn, the
environment can neither beget nor specify the nature of sys-
temic operations, although the environment is an essential
condition for the system being able to reproduce its own op-
erations. In other words, environmental perturbations are nev-
er instructive for a system; on the other hand, without pertur-
bations a system cannot instruct itself about what shall be
done. This complicated situation is possible through the struc-
tural coupling of system and environment.
The concept of structural coupling refers to any environ-
mental condition, which allows systemic self-irritation, i.e.,
which enables the system to irritate itself ([34] p. 80, p. 93–
95; [35] p. 61). The environment cannot produce systemic
operations (wood is not speaking), nor trigger systemic irrita-
tions (a burning wood gives no alarm). Every irritation is
produced by the system through its own operations and arises
against the background of those structures of expectation
which coincide with the system’s current state. In this very
sense, irritations are Bpurely internal constructs^ and arise
every time as perturbations, deviations or surprises ([36] p.
1432). This empirical assumption also implies that the infor-
mation value of an environmental event does not depend on
the event as such, rather it is contingent on system’s structures.
Consequently, irritation is the intra-systemic side of the struc-
tural coupling of system and environment, that is, it marks one
side of a form whose opposite side is indifference.
Telling examples of social irritation are ecological threats.
In this respect, as well known, the search for warning signals
is feverish and often becomes a reason for social tensions.
However, if we remember the principle of operational closure
of communication systems, it is clear that only society can
threaten itself ([37] Ch. 6). In order to irritate and alarm itself,
society can also employ very simple structures, for instance,
distinctions. I would like to give an example.
The water of a river does what it does: it flows. We may
draw a distinction, for instance 8 metres. This distinction is a
technical device that works as a kind of threshold value. The
distinction let the observer oscillate between over and under
insofar as river rises or not, so that the observer can have some
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information. From this standpoint, signal is a difference for
information processing. Without a difference, indeed, nothing
can look like a selection and be thus information. Moreover,
the information value of an event depends on the selectivity of
selection. Such selectivity, in turn, depends on the number of
possibilities, that is, the variety that a system can deal with.
For instance, to guess the name of a person is much more
informative than to guess his or her sex. Hence, not only
observers depend on information, but also information de-
pends on observers. In other terms, information is never trans-
mitted by the environment, rather it is Bgenerated by
observers^ ([38] p. 658).
This condition also goes for signals. A red light is informa-
tive for the one who just got the driving license in a different
sense compared to the one who is working in an industrial
plant. In everyday life, this is almost a truism and can be learnt
very quickly. What instead is often neglected is the highly
selective nature of signals that process information.
Structural coupling itself cannot take into account everything
is occurring in the environment, otherwise system should ad-
dress an information overload. Rather, systems balance high
irritability with high indifference. Signals focus system’s at-
tention on environmental events which could have a surpris-
ing effect for the system; simultaneously, they distract sys-
tem’s attention from other events which are not taken into
account and could become a second-order surprise.11
Technology and the use of computer hugely increase the
irritability of social systems, so they help (if not even substi-
tute) perception in many fields. Nowadays, no one would take
the control of the danger of volcanic eruption seriously by
looking at rising smoke. Technology provides society with a
highly complicated and opaque system of technically con-
trolled indicators. As always in the case of structural coupling,
these indicators increase the structural uncertainties which the
operationally closed communication system has to cope with.
These structural uncertainties do represent what might be
called social signalling system: its outcome is not simply an
increase of security, but also a concurrent increase of uncer-
tainty which society is able to address. This is the reason why,
while actually living in a safer society, we feel that we live in a
society that is substantially more vulnerable than before.12
While structuring the systemic irritability towards environ-
mental perturbations, signalling bounds the systemic capabil-
ity to process information. To be coherent, we should say that
it is not a signal that informs the system, rather it is the system
that informs itself through a signal.13 This reasoning also ex-
plains why the same whistle that for players is the signal of the
beginning (or the end) of the match, for my dog is the signal of
running back to me.
On a temporal dimension, signalling combines the simul-
taneousness of system and environment with the problem of
their synchronization. System and environment behave simul-
taneously because time flows for both with the same speed.
Neither can the system stay behind in the past while the envi-
ronment is moving forward into the future, nor can the envi-
ronment be anticipated by a system that is running more
speedily toward the future. Therefore, anticipation is possible
just because environment cannot be anticipated.14
If a system is complex enough, it can combine the tempo-
rality of its operations with the temporality of environmental
events, and look for some synchronization. Formal organiza-
tions know this problem very well and they deal with it espe-
cially when they are coping with warning signals. This point
deserves further investigation.
Both time and attention are scarce resources. Scarcity in-
creases when time and attention interact with each other.
When only little time is available to solve a problem, one
has to focus his attention on this problem; however, when
one is focusing his attention on a problem, he must relinquish
something else that could be taken into consideration only if
more time were available. Signals that trigger irritation cata-
lyze attention. Through sign systems, cognitive systems si-
multaneously save attention and produce attention. From this
standpoint, pain might be regarded as an evolutionary
advance.
Pain compels consciousness to become aware that some-
thing in body is wrong – which otherwise went unnoticed
because consciousness and body are not operatively linked
with each other, although consciousness depends on the
autopoietic closure of a living organism. Therefore, a sign
system is a type of ‘attention equipment’;15 in social systems,
it is used to distract people’s attention from everyday life and
to focus their attention on a still uncertain situation that even-
tually requires a structural change (when fire alarm is belling,
teachers cannot go on teaching as if nothing had happened).
Although these structural changes usually are provisional,
alarmism is an almost permanent hallmark of modern society.
Here again we address a temporal issue. A warning signal
should be given neither too late nor too early. In the former
case, there would not be time enough to react to the signalized
threat. In the latter case, the warning signal could spread un-
necessary panic, or change danger circumstances so that,
eventually, signalling itself proves inefficient [39, 43, 44].
The difference between alarm and alarmism does not solve
the problem; it simply defines it. If we investigate the criteria
that control the difference between alarm and alarmism in the11 The distinction between surprise and second-order surprise is drawn
from Turner, Pidgeon [39].
12 On this paradox, see Cevolini [40]. See also below, § 6.
13 Luhmann ([41] p. 32) speaks of BUmformung von irritierenden
Signalen in Informationen^ (transformation of irritating signals into in-
formation). The matter is to explain what does it mean ‘transformation’.
14 On this point, see § 4.
15 This concept (Aufmerksamkeitsapparat) is drawn from Waldenfels
([42] p. 14).
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moment-in-being, we address the undecidability of decisional
situations again. The true question rather is on what is based
the credibility of a warning signal. As any structural coupling,
also warning signals imply the simultaneity of system and
environment. The paradoxical effect is that the efficiency of
signals depends on the impossibility of verifying their effi-
ciency, as Lars Clausen and Wolf Dombrowsky clearly
proved. Also, we should remind that warning against risks
implies the risk of warning. As the lacking of warning signals
makes it impossible to react to threats by means of prompt
remedies, so the excess of alarm can produce a tailing-off of
attention (as those who live on the volcano slopes know very
well), or the loss of credibility of the signal itself (the ‘crying
wolf’mechanism). In addition, there is the well-known danger
of self-fulfilling prophecies: warning triggers the catastrophe
which one would avoid simply because it has been communi-
cated ([45] Ch. 13).
Anticipatory systems in anticipatory environments
The question could be raised BHow is it possible that an event
is understood by social systems as a signal of an impending
change?^. The systemic coupling with natural environment is
relatively less complicated compared with the systemic cou-
pling with social environment because nature usually behaves
as a trivial machine. Otherwise, there would be no pharma-
ceutical industry. In the social world, the interpretation of sig-
nals is more complicated because society usually behaves as a
historical machine. To disentangle this complexity, we shall
return to the idea of anticipation.
The principle of operational closure does not admit that the
system can anticipate its environment, and this is also true
when the environment is conceived as future threat. Such mis-
understanding is the result of a thick description made by a
third party who describes the interplay of system and environ-
ment. However, if the environment is operationally unreach-
able, how is it possible an anticipatory system? For cybernet-
ics, the matter is how it is possible for a cognitive system (for
instance, brain) to construct internal representations of the
outside world so that the system can recognize a shape without
having every time to start all over again ([46] p. 25 ff.). The
problem of anticipation cannot be decoupled from the prob-
lem of memory. The capability to perceive, the capability to
recall, and the capability to infer depend on each other, as
Heinz von Foerster [47] explained, because without percep-
tion no cognitive system can produce inner representations of
outer regularities, and without recollection of these regularities
a system cannot anticipate future events.
In very abstract terms, we may state that the system is
complex enough to combine these three performances – per-
ception, recollection, and inference – if it is able to represent
the unity of the difference between system and environment
inside the system. Such re-entry of the distinction in what has
been distinguished16 enables the system to compensate for the
lack of operational contact with the external environment by
means of internal performances. Thus, instead of controlling
the environment, the system can control its lack of control
over the environment. The very fact that this control is effi-
cient does not depend on the isomorphic relationship between
inner representation and anticipated environment.
Isomorphism is just what an operationally closed system can
never verify. Realism of representations is simply a descrip-
tion (performed by an external observer) of a systemic reac-
tion suited to the conservation of adaptation to the respective
environment.
The re-entry of the distinction in what has been distin-
guished allows the system to handle the distinction between
self- and hetero-reference. This distinction is managed both in
the system and by the system; also the external reference is
thus internal with respect to the system that is referring to its
own environment. Self-referential systems of this type can
usually fulfil two fundamental performances: selection and
generalization. On one side, the matter is to factor out what
repeats when the system is dealing with a certain type of
objects. On the other side, the matter is to generalize what
has been selected and to preserve it as a type of redundancy17
(shape, enduring constants, representation) [46]. In this way,
the cognitive system can take its distance from the respective
environment (it can gain autonomy) – e.g., the idea of dura-
tion has no duration.
According to cognitive psychology, this assumption im-
plies that the system can construct a field (or cognitive) map
of its environment [49]. The construction of this map is an
internal performance that does not depend on information
produced by the external environment. According to construc-
tivism, the environment is what it is; it can neither inform nor
instruct the system. If we think seriously upon the principle of
operational closure, the question is not so much whether the
inner map is consistent with the outer space, but how can the
system react to the external environment in a suitable manner
by referring to itself and to its own representations of the
reality. If it is not the maze that informs the mouse, we shall
admit that it is the mouse that informs himself when he is
walking through the maze. Otherwise, cognitive systems
could not be provided with autonomy. A prerequisite and a
consequence of such autonomy are ant ic ipatory
performances.
The result of systemic decoupling from environment is the
arising of a systemic temporality. This temporality implies the
development of some type of language. On the biological
16 The concept of ‘re-entry’ is drawn from the laws of form developed by
Spencer Brown [48].
17 I use the term ‘redundancy’ according to the well-known mathematical
theory of communication developed by Shannon. Redundancy is what
repeats and is therefore predictable.
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level, we know that some hormones trigger enzymes that be-
have for organisms as ‘predictors’ of future developments, so
the organism can get ready to anticipatorily react to these
changes. Those who take part in conversation act ‘tactfully’
if they anticipate the reaction of communication partners to
their utterance, for instance, by avoiding embarrassing ques-
tions [50].
Anticipatory systems of this type are regarded as intelligent
systems. In turn, intelligence may be regarded as an anticipa-
tory performance based on systemic behaviour. Indeed, it is
possible to ask the question BWhose anticipation?^.18 But also
BWhat is actually anticipated?^. If we take into account what
has been said so far, it is clear that the only answer consistent
with a constructivist approach is that systems can anticipate
their environment since the environment let itself never be
anticipated. Or in simple terms: when it is performed, antici-
pation is always a future-referred present operation.
If future could be anticipated, there would be nothing more
to anticipate; eventually, nothing more to do. Systems do not
react to the future as such; they rather react to their own an-
ticipations of the future. Every policyholder is well aware of it.
When he seizes the opportunity of taking out an insurance, he
anticipates the possibility that the premium can be paid in vain
if the claim that he was afraid of or had calculated in advance
does not occur. In social systems, the situation is very compli-
cated because social systems usually behave as a historical
machine. Every field map, like a financial model or rational
forecast, changes the field (i.e., the reality as such) that is
mapped for the simple reason that it is communicated, thus
making the same map somehow unreliable [52]. Moreover,
every map, just like every distinction, has no real correspon-
dence in the external environment. This basic condition (in
usual terms, the map is not the territory) does not exclude that
a map may be very fitting and successful, for instance as a
field map of an organization. However, the transitory success
is not due to the map as such, it is rather due to a transitory
adaptation of social system and environment through the map.
Moving from these assumptions, we can understand what is
the most relevant drawback of Robert Rosen’s anticipatory
theory.
In Rosen’s theory, anticipatory behaviour is distinguished
from reactive behaviour because in the former case time plays
a crucial role. A system is an anticipatory system if it contains
Ba predictive model of itself and/or of its environment, which
allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the
model’s predictions pertaining to a later instant^ ([3] p. 339).
However, an inner-social environment is very different com-
pared with a spatial environment. First, because when we
move in the space, space does not move, and this is the reason
why a field map is efficient. The relationship between input
and output, in others words, remains invariant. Society
behaves in different manner. As any historical machine, soci-
ety changes recursively when a new event arises and is com-
pared with the available systemic redundancy. In this case, the
relationship between input and output is variable and depends
on past.
Furthermore, social systems arise from double contingen-
cy. Usually, space does not react to the observers’movements
unless it has been intentionally constructed for this purpose.19
In social systems, the observer who is aware that he is object
of an anticipatory behaviour by his communication partner
will for sure anticipate such anticipation. Consequently, a
more or less unpredictable situation arises (e.g., when partners
play chess). In other words, both system and environment are
performing an anticipatory behaviour. For instance, politics is
simultaneously system and environment: it is an autonomous
social system and an (anticipatory) environment for other so-
cial systems as economy. When politics tries to anticipate
economic reactions by means of political decisions, economy
reacts anticipatorily. The financial crisis has clearly demon-
strated that an unpredictable situation thus arises. As a conse-
quence, to speak of anticipatory systems is not enough; we
should also speak of anticipatory environments and ask the
question BHow is it possible for a system to behave anticipatorily
when it interacts with an anticipatory environment?^.20
Anticipation turns into a reflexive performance, and second-
order anticipations arise from such reflexivity.
When we deal with social systems, we must remember that
internal representations of external environment are ‘clusters
of expectations’. In this respect, Sommerhoff introduced the
Bprinciple of expectancy ,^ namely, the systemic capability to
build up a Bwhat-leads-to-what^ expectancy [46]. By means
of expectancy, the cognitive system can fulfil predictions and
inferential performances. For instance, it can prevent the clash
with a moving object, or it can hit a moving target. Moreover,
it can learn to the extent that it can replace (that is, forget)
disappointed expectations with expectations that more likely
will be fulfilled.
However, the crucial question is BWhat does trigger these
expectations?^. The systemic reaction to environment goes
through the systemic reaction to systemic expectations toward
18 As Riegler ([51] p. 11–12) does.
19 For instance, I think of a maze where an open door is closed when the
mouse goes through it a second time – and it is closed just because once
the mouse went through it. I do not know whether psychological exper-
iments of this kind have been realized.
20 Rosen ([3] p. 403) already focused on the same problemwith respect to
the game theory, which he regarded as insufficient. According to Rosen,
the theory of interacting anticipatory systems did represent Banother di-
rection for future research^. Today, cognitive sciences speak of Badaptive
learning systems^ [53]. However, results are rather disappointing. Riegler
[1] suggests to make a distinction between weak and strong anticipation:
the former type of anticipation is based on ‘predictive models’ of the
environment; by contrast, the latter type of anticipation is based on sys-
temic self-organization – thus, systems can relinquish inner models of
their outer environment.
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the environment.21 The reaction is efficient if triggering is
highly selective. The hypothesis of self-referential systems
theory is that this selectivity is conditioned by external refer-
ences. In other words, when the reference to an environmental
event can trigger the systemic self-reference again, the system
can selectively combine the recollection of past experience
and the expectation of future events. In this very case, we
can say that the event performs a signalling function for the
system. The purpose of the well-known research developed by
Pavlov on conditioned reflexes was, in fact, to understand
how it is possible that a whatever environmental event can
perform a signalling function and trigger an anticipatory be-
haviour in a cognitive system. System’s performance (its ‘in-
telligence’) can be explained by means of the distinction be-
tween event and structure.
Whereas events mark irreversibility, structures mark tem-
poral reversibility ([54] p. 73 ff., p. 389 f.). The system can
quickly react to an event that appears and disappears, and
quickly forget what happened. In this case, the systemic be-
haviour is very similar to the model (environmental) stimulus/
(systemic) reaction. Or, the event can make tracks in the sys-
tem, which thus reacts more slowly [55]. An association of
ideas arises which coincides with a peculiar systemic expec-
tation. Indeed, expectation has no duration, whereas the per-
ception of duration is the outcome of an expectation. The
expected event is (and remains) uncertain, whereas the expec-
tation of such an event provides the system with a relative
certainty, which is used to get some bearings in an environ-
ment that remains unforeseeable. An event is a structuring
event if it can change systemic past, thus binding the way
the system get ready to react to the future. In other terms, if
it can shape the way the system recursively combines self- and
external reference.
Since they are based on expectations, system’s orientations
may also fail. Expectations can be not only confirmed but also
disappointed. Pavlov’s dogs can be easily defused if no food is
served when the experimenter rings the bell. This prerequisite
is often forgotten in social systems, so the model of reality is
eventually confused with the reality represented by the model.
From this standpoint, we could say that reality is everything
that is not anticipated when one tries to anticipate reality, as
the financial crisis dramatically proved.22 However, an occa-
sional disappointment is not enough to relinquish expecta-
tions. The commuting worker who has no train to come back
home because of a rail strike does not relinquish his expecta-
tion that the day after trains will travel again. When disap-
pointments trigger long-term structural changes, on the
contrary, social sciences speak of learning or evolution. But
this is subject for another research.
Warning signals in social systems
The reasoning developed so far is very abstract. I would like to
return to the main topic of this article, namely, weak signals,
moving from an empirical example. In a newspaper article
published in 2015, Luca Ricolfi [58] commented some news
spread by the Italian Government on a supposed economic
recovery. On the basis of data concerning employment in the
first 2 months of 2015, the Italian Government spoke of clear
signals of an upturn in economy. An evidence was that in the
first 2 months of 2014, the amount of permanent employments
had been 112,000 unities per month, whereas in the first
2 months of the next year it was 152,000 unities per month,
which implies a 35 % increase. Thus, the Italian Government
spoke of an Bextraordinary acceleration^ (Bformidabile
accelerazione^) of employment at the beginning of the new
year. Ricolfi noted that, if compared with further data, these
figures could have a different meaning. In the first 3 months of
2014, the amount of permanent employments had been
147,000 unities per month. Compared with this average, the
already mentioned average of 152,000 unities per month in
the subsequent year (with exclusion of data referring to
March; at that time they were not yet available) clearly was
substantially less ‘extraordinary’ than it appeared. Moreover,
Ricolfi pointed out that the amount 152,000 was nearly the
same average of two ‘horrible’ years, 2011 and 2012. Last but
not least, the Italian sociologist regretted that along with data
concerning employment, the Italian Government did not com-
municate data concerning ‘cancellations’, that is, ceased em-
ployment relationships during the same period, thus making a
calculus of employment balance impossible.
Ricolfi’s empirical observations are telling for many rea-
sons, which I can here only briefly list. Ricolfi is obviously
right when he reveals the slyness of public communication
that manipulates seemingly objective statistical data to spread
optimism among public opinion. However, the distinction be-
tween ‘true signals’ and ‘smoke signals’ does not grasp the
complexity of future-referred signals. Warning signs have the
same logical drawbacks of future contingencies. The only cer-
tainty is the distinction between two contradictory events. The
current observer cannot formulate any absolutely true or false
proposition about the event that will actually occur. In addi-
tion, Ricolfi’s article shows another fundamental attitude of
modern society: the use of statistical probability in order to
have some (anticipatory) orientation in view of the future.
Statistical probability is perhaps the most relevant anticipa-
tory system of modern society, and represents the functional
substitute for the ancient virtue of prudence. A striking con-
sequence is that, thanks to statistics, past is both highly
21 Cf. Sommerhoff ([46] p. 31): BOur reactions to the external world are
formed physiologically as reactions to the activated models^ (italics
added).
22 Cf. Esposito [56]. See also Derman ([57] p. 5 ff.) who speaks of
Bfoolish consistency of financial models^.
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informative and poorly instructive for present in view of an
unknown future. In a sense, we could say that past is of no
importance – if social systems produce discriminations, they
do that by means of self-referential criteria as, for instance,
examination in educational system or general election in po-
litical system, for sure not because of familiar membership or
gender distinctions23 – and this is the reason why past is so
obsessively calculated. From numerical clusters, and – as
Ricolfi’s article clearly demonstrates – from comparisons be-
tween numerical clusters one can mine information that can be
used to cope with complexity rather than to forecast a future
which in spite of everything remains unpredictable [59].
Statistics has another advantage: it offers a type of ‘second-
ary normality’ that explains the deviation in everyday life as a
normal event ([15] p. 1). Thanks to statistics and statistical
probability, the oddity becomes credible that also contingency
has its own order, that is to say, that there is some regularity in
random distributions and that such regularity can even be
calculated. Those who go beyond the limit of disbelief can
use the regularities of chance as rules for decision-making.
Obviously, this does not imply that one has the certainty of
taking the right decision, as gamblers know very well. What
can be achieved rather is a sort of ‘substitute for certainty’ by
means of which one can plan actions, figure out short- or long-
term strategies, and make profit, as the existence of insurance
companies actually demonstrates.24
However, reckoning does not eliminate dangers in every-
day life, and does not give any information on the single case.
The average of car accidents does not inform the policyholder
whether or not he will be involved (whether or not insurance is
profitable). Nonetheless, it can justify a risky decision that
remains right also when it eventually proves to be wrong.
Consequently, the calculus of probability problematizes and
de-problematizes the future that the calculus itself pretends to
anticipate. It problematizes future because it calculates what
indeed cannot be calculated – which is better than fatalism, in
any case. It de-problematizes future because it offers a reason
(in a sense, an alibi) for taking a decision despite the uncer-
tainty of the situation. In short, what is calculated is the igno-
rance of the decision-maker, and the oddity is that this calculus
of ignorance is based on a highly sophisticated mathematical
calculus ([62] p. 50).
This mathematics of ignorance – essentially, an oxymoron
– replaces the problem of anticipation with a problem of quan-
tification. Both past and future are reduced to percentages.
However, as the future that becomes present is never exactly
the same that had been predicted (it would be a highly
improbable outcome if future were exactly the same that had
been calculated), so the present past that the decision-maker
shall address in order to conjecture upon the future is some-
how different. Despite the fact that, by definition, past cannot
be changed, past continually changes with respect to the
meaning of statistical data. One of the most relevant conse-
quences of this type of combination of past and future in every
moment-in-being is that past must be continually updated.
In the mid-18th century, social scientists had already noted
that statistics is characterized by a ‘chronic obsolescence’, and
that for the same reason every decision-making process must
address the irregularity of statistical regularities [61, 63].
Consequently, statistical calculations simply offer a provision-
al orientation. Nobody would legitimate decisions taken on
the basis of old statistical reports. Thus, society remembers
substantially more than before. However, it also forgets more
quickly than before. As a consequence, the anticipation of a
contingent future is in turn a contingent performance – which
finally clarifies the consistency of reversible (if not even con-
tradictory) decisions.
The culture of alertness
The problem of weak signals has been mostly investigated by
the sociology of formal organizations, especially of those that
make use of high technology, for instance airports or nuclear
facilities [64, 65]. The control of the lack of control is repre-
sented here by the semantics of ‘vulnerability’. Scholars do
not state that vulnerability is a fault to be removed, rather they
hold the opinion that it is an inherent property of any social
system, so everybody has to copy with it in order to be sur-
prised by an unforeseeable future as little as possible [66, 67].
A disaster materializes system’s vulnerability. It usually oc-
curs in the form of interruption of organizational routines. The
functional advantage of the latter is that they save attention.
However, for the same reason they may become a great ob-
stacle to the ability of paying attention to the first weak signals
that precede the occurring of unexpected events. The matter is
not simply the lack of information, but the overload of infor-
mation which people have to cope with when time for pro-
cessing is scarce.
By means of technology, as already seen, the problem be-
comes even worse. Indeed, technology implies an extension
and complication of that social signalling through which so-
ciety can gain information in a self-referential way. A further
‘adverse effect’ is that, because of operational closure, tech-
nology can only be technologically controlled. The paradox-
ical outcome is that, while the technical control of a danger is a
risk, the spreading of the risk of dangers controlling technol-
ogies (and of technologies controlling technologies) in turn
becomes an incontrollable danger. Since technologies gives
experts the impression of keeping everything under control
23 If distinctions like good and bad students were based on gender or
familiar membership, the educational system would be regarded as a
discriminating system.
24 Cf. Esposito ([60] p. 72–73, p. 100–103). See also D’Amador ([61] p.
32), according to whom Bla probabilité n’est en quelque sorte que le
substitut de la certitude^.
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and being able to face unexpected events, they let them ill-
equipped when an unpredictable event occurs; for instance,
when technology or technology controlling technology sud-
denly doesn’t function.
If the experience accrued by social studies on disasters is
generalized, the real problem seems to be that the concerned
system (for instance, a formal organization) doesn’t know that
it doesn’t know. The ignorance which social systems are ad-
dressing is not simply a first-order ignorance, that is, I known
that I do not know. In other terms, the matter is not simply that
information is still lacking. The situation is even worse be-
cause nobody really knows which lacking information will be
more relevant in the future. The observing system is address-
ing a second-order ignorance, or ‘superignorance’ ([68] p.
5 ff.; [69] p. 93): it doesn’t know that it doesn’t know. So, if
the debate on weak signals always contains the latent question
BWhy did you not know that you didn’t know that you didn’t
know?^, the only answer one can give is BJust for this
reason^. In this very sense, the idea of weak signals attempts
to symbolically hide the paradox of (lacking) information on
the lack of information.
The second-order ignorance is a consequence of the fact
that the blind spot, which is embedded in every observation,
cannot be eliminated, even when the observing system per-
forms reflexivity. The problem of uncertainty becomes
autological. The matter is not simply that future is uncertain.
The observer also addresses the uncertainty of the uncertainty
that he is addressing by means of anticipatory performances.
After a disaster, the meaning of anticipation can be retrospec-
tively re-constructed. Right now, the observer understands
that he did not know that he did not know. In other words,
he understands that in his expectations there was a void.
Facing a so complicated situation, scholars look like
resigned. On one side, formal organizations legitimate their
decisions by acknowledging in advance that they do not know
which outcome these decisions will have [70]. On the other
side, the anticipatory paradigm is substituted by a cognitive
and practical habit called resilience.25 Instead of getting ready
to react to unexpected events, social systems get ready to react
to unpredictability by preparing in advance the capability of
facing the counter-expected event after it occurred. At the
same time, the sociology of organizations recommends to
compensate for the blindness of management routines by
Broutinely suspecting^ that organizational expectations are in-
complete. The organization is thus encouraged to live in con-
dition of Bchronic fear^, to act mindfully, so that it can give
Bstrong responses to weak signals^ [72]. However, this
Bmindfulness^ (just like the difference between alarm and
alarmism)26 does not solve the problem, it simply defines it.
The Bstruggle for alertness^, moreover, is very expensive for
the organization both in temporal and attentional (or, econom-
ic) terms. If one waits too long to be sure that he has every
information he needs in order to take the right decision, he
eventually misses the best opportunities.
To be coherent with the principle of operational closure, we
should admit that the problem of weak signals can be solved
only through signals, just as scientific problems can be solved
only through scientific research, not for instance through mor-
al issues. Here, the matter is not so much to think out signals
that can signalize the occurring of weak signals. The matter
rather is to think up signals that make social systems’ irrita-
bility increase. We may guess that technology has a key role
again in this respect. In principle, there is no limit to the in-
vention of technological devices which can increase social
systems’ sensibility for unpredictable environmental events.
Every time a device of this type is designed, the invention is
regarded as an outcome of progress, or civilization. However,
in this way systems run the risk that increasing information
begets more confusion rather than more orientation. Social
sciences should ask the question BTo what extent is society
able to bear the information overload that society itself con-
tinually reproduces?^.
When the respective environment is the same society, so-
cial systems address a chronic lack of redundancy. An event is
perceived. However, as it is the first time that it occurs, no-
body knows to which experience it should be referred, conse-
quently nobody knows what kind of future development one
has to wait for. The map is incomplete because, instead of
being a field map, it is a map of the relationships between
social and temporal contingency. Under such conditions, in
the available present it is harder to select those indicators that
with more certainty correlate with possible future changes,
and to do it just in view of systemic anticipatory reactions.
The outcome is that in social systems any signal is actually
weak, never strong, and this very fact somehow jeopardizes
the validity of the difference between weak and strong.27
Finally, social sciences usually move from the assumption
that the problem (of anticipation) has a solution, so the ques-
tion is simply how can we get such solution. On the contrary,
social system theorymoves from the assumption that the prob-
lem has no solution at all (future can be anticipated because it
cannot be anticipated). The true question is therefore BWhy
are we addressing the problem (of anticipation), despite the
fact that future is and remains unforeseeable?^. Why is society
dealing with such a paradox? What is the usefulness of a
problem that cannot be solved? This is, in my opinion, the
25 Cf. Wildavsky ([69] p. 77 ff., p. 122). Ansoff ([17] p. 22) already spoke
of Bstrategic surprises^. Behind the term ‘strategic’, as Luhmann ([71] p.
1087) pointed out, lies the paradox of the inclusion of excluded
possibilities.
26 See above, § 3.
27 The same conclusion arises also in recent debates on weak signals.
According to Mendonça et al. ([73] p. 221), Bthere are no strategically
relevant signals per se^.
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real challenge of the anticipatory issue in future studies – and
for future studies.28
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